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SUMMARY 
 
The legislation that gave birth to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission provides for the 
possibility of amnesty to the perpetrators of certain crimes and delicts. It also provides for the 
possibility of reparations to the victims of apartheid who suffered as a result of their human 
rights being grossly violated. The problem with the legislation is that it is only competent to 
deal with matters falling within its ambit, but there are numerous issues that still need to be 
addressed which clearly fall outside of it. One might be tempted to say that such issues falling 
beyond the scope of the TRC mandate should then be dealt with according to the ordinary 
principles governing the legal relationship between those who suffer a loss and those that 
cause their loss. But the difficulty is that the unjust benefits and wrongful burdens imposed 
and facilitated by apartheid are effectively passed on from generation to generation. The 
descendants of apartheid’s victims continue to suffer a grave disadvantage. And in addition to 
this it is not only the actual perpetrators of the abuses that have benefited from apartheid but 
also later generations of white South Africans and corporations who continue to enjoy 
unequal advantage to springboard themselves ahead of black competitors who are still, for the 
most part, shackled by the disadvantage of apartheid. Whilst the state has made significant 
                                               
∗
 The following work was developed out of the two authors’ contribution to a submission 
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efforts to address the imbalance in society, and in the process accepted a tremendous burden, 
no meaningful effort has yet come from civil society and the unjust profiteers of the apartheid 
system. In this paper, we have attempted to confront some of these difficult issues. This 
article explores the possibility of converting the moral justification that seeks to hold these 
unjust profiteers liable into legal argument. 
 
 
 
“They were conquerors - nothing to boast of, when you have it, since your 
strength is just an accident arising from the weakness of others. They 
grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got. It was 
robbery with violence, aggravated murder on a grand scale” (From Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness). 
“The United Party comes and whines ‘the constitution’. Anyone listening 
would think that the constitution was of greater importance to them than the 
maintenance of white civilization in our country” (Loubscher, National Party 
MP, 1952).1 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Much has been written on the legal liability of the South African state for the 
gross violations of human rights that occurred under apartheid. Most of the 
debate relating to the state’s obligation to pay reparations to the victims 
takes place in the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s 
mandate. But there is notably very little written on the liability of other 
parties that have profited from apartheid but who happen to fall outside the 
scope of the TRC’s mandate. The little material that there is tends to 
approach this controversial issue from a moral perspective rather than from a 
legal one. This is hardly surprising since the legal enquiry of who should pay 
what to whom raises very difficult jurisprudential questions and this is 
probably the reason such issues have been largely avoided till now. 
 
  In this paper, we have attempted to confront some of these difficult issues. 
Our goal is to begin the process of converting the moral arguments into legal 
ones and in this way to encourage further debate on those aspects of the 
topic that have been largely neglected in the literature.2 
 
2 THE  APARTHEID  STATE’S  VIOLATIONS  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  LAW 
 
Broadly, the apartheid state violated the rights of black South Africans by 
                                               
1
 Quoted in Asmal, Asmal and Roberts Reconciliation through Truth: A Reckoning of 
Apartheid’s Criminal Governance (1997) 111. 
2
 We wish to point out that this paper is an overview of some of the issues that are raised 
by the subject material. It is not intended to be more than that, as each one of the topics, 
on their own, could quite easily form the basis of a substantial thesis. 
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(i) denying them the right to self determination; 
(ii) discriminating against them on the grounds of race and colour; and 
through the 
(iii) widespread infringements of a range of rights including the right to 
property, the right to life, the right to be free from cruel, inhumane, 
and degrading treatment, to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention, 
and the rights to freedom of movement, opinion, expression, peaceful 
assembly and association.3 
 
  Some of these violations are covered by the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act (the “Act”) while others fall outside the scope of the 
Act.4 The Act only covers gross violations of human rights as defined in 
section 1(ix): (a) as “the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of 
any person”; or in (b) as “any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, 
command or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a) 
which emanated from conflicts of the past”. Denial of the rights to self 
determination, to be free from discrimination and many of the other rights 
listed in (iii) above are not covered by the Act. 
 
  The Act provides for the possibility of amnesty to the perpetrators of these 
crimes and delicts5 while also providing the victims with a right to 
reparations6 - but limited to those who came before the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission within the specified time period.7 This raises at 
least three very complex legal issues: first, can those who receive amnesty in 
South Africa still be brought to justice in other jurisdictions; secondly, what 
                                               
3
 Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) generally and in 
particular 130-136; and Forster, Davis and Sandler Detention and Torture in South 
Africa: Psychological, Legal and Historical Studies (1987) 86-118; and Mathews 
Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law (1986) 62. 
4
 The right to hold private property is an extremely complex issue and for this reason the 
violation of property rights in general lie beyond the scope of this paper. 
5
 Applications for amnesties are provided for in s 18 of the Act. S 20(1) of the Act states: 
“If the Committee, after considering an application for amnesty, is satisfied that -  
(a) the application complies with the requirements of this Act; 
(b) the act, omission or offence to which the application relates is an act associated 
with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past in 
accordance with the provisions of subsections (2) and (3); and 
(c) the applicant has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts, it shall grant 
amnesty in respect of that act, omission or offence.” 
  S 20(2) further specifies the meaning of “political objective”. 
6
 S 26(1) of the Act provides for the right of victims of gross violations of human rights to 
apply to the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation in the prescribed form. 
7
 The obligation of the post-apartheid South African state to pay reparations to victims 
who submitted their cases before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission within the 
specified time is taken as settled. These claims are unaffected by the discussion that 
follows in this paper. 
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of those who are guilty of crimes and delicts that fall outside of the ambit of 
the Act - can they still be sued or prosecuted either here or abroad; and 
thirdly, since international law does not recognize statutes of limitations for 
some crimes, do the victims still have a right to a remedy even if they missed 
the prescriptive time-limitations period under the Act? 
 
  The short answer to the first question is that under certain circumstances it 
might be possible for other states to prosecute and for victims to seek redress 
against perpetrators for some of the above violations of international law 
irrespective of any amnesty given by the South African state.8 This 
possibility is amplified in cases where the foreign state has ratified the 
Apartheid Convention before the atrocities came to an end in South Africa.9 
 
  The short answer to the second question is that it may be possible to sue for 
legal wrongs not covered by the provisions of the Act and it may also be 
possible for criminal charges to be brought.10 Section 232 of the 1996 
Constitution makes customary international law binding law in South Africa 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. It thus 
follows that customary international criminal law is law in South Africa. For 
this reason, those whose actions are not covered by the Act as well as those 
who either did not apply for amnesty or who were denied amnesty can still 
be prosecuted for their crimes and sued privately for their wrongs. 
 
  However, any argument to this effect could feasibly be met with the 
following replies. First, it may be argued that the intent and purpose of the 
Act is to settle the apartheid crime record so that the nation can move on in 
the spirit of reconciliation. Potential crimes not specifically addressed in the 
                                               
8
 This is partially dealt with in the Pinochet case (R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary 
Magistrate: Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1990] 2 WLR 272 (HL); [1999] 1 All ER 
577 (HL). One might also wish to consider the right of other states to bring claims on 
behalf of their own nationals against the South African state under international law 
governing state responsibility for injury to aliens. There is also the possibility of 
delictual liability in certain jurisdictions, for example the United States, under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act 28 USC s 1350 (1789/1994). Some of these issues are considered by 
Jenkins, “Amnesty for gross violations of human rights in South Africa: a better way of 
dealing with the past” in Edge (ed) Comparative Law in Global Perspective (2001) 345-
386. 
9
 The Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crimes of Apartheid, United 
Nations GA Resolution 3068 of 30 November 1973 (the Apartheid Convention). Article 
V of the Apartheid Convention stipulates that perpetrators may be prosecuted by any 
state party which may acquire jurisdiction or by an international tribunal with 
jurisdiction and article VI requires state parties to adopt legislation and other measures 
to bring perpetrators to justice through trials and punishment regardless of the 
perpetrators’ residency status or nationality. 
10
 We are not referring here to those people who either did not apply for amnesty under the 
Act for wrongs covered by the Act, nor to those who were denied amnesty, but rather to 
those who committed wrongs that fall outside the scope of the Act.  
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Act were arguably left out because they were considered to be either too 
diffuse (ie the responsibility of all rather than specific individuals and to the 
detriment of all rather than specific victims) or else because they were not 
considered to be as important. Thus, pursuing prosecutions for crimes not 
specifically addressed by the Act could arguably be inconsistent with the 
intention behind the TRC legislation. This would undermine any claim under 
section 232 of the Constitution that this aspect of customary international 
law was binding in South Africa. The second reply would be that holding 
such people liable violates the doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime 
without law). Although South Africa is a common law criminal jurisdiction, 
the courts tend to regard this part of the common law as a closed book. Any 
attempt to introduce new crimes (since 1915) is generally regarded as a 
violation of the “no crime without law” principle.11  
 
  The first reply might carry some weight with regard to pursuing criminal 
prosecutions within the Republic but the arguments do not have the same 
force when considering the question of delictual liability. There are 
numerous factors that may inhibit the state from pursuing criminal 
prosecutions and the above may provide a valid consideration for 
prosecutorial discretion. However, in order to oust a victim’s right to a 
remedy in private law, the legislation ought to be clear and unequivocal. As 
the Act is silent on the matter, the presumption is that the right has not been 
limited further than that stipulated in the Act.12 It is one thing to oust 
victims’ rights to claim in delict against their perpetrators (as was done by 
the Interim Constitution and the Act), but it is quite another to oust potential 
claims not specifically stipulated in the Act.13  
 
  The second reply should fail for the same reason that it failed at the 
Nuremberg trials; the courts would not be creating a new crime that 
retroactively applied to conduct that was legal at the time it was committed 
because the conduct was always illegal under binding rules of customary 
international law.14 
 
                                               
11
 R v M 1915 CPD 334. 
12
 The presumption that the legislature is presumed not to have intended to deprive an 
individual of existing common law and statutory rights is well established in South 
Africa (see, eg Transvaal Investment Co v Springs Municipality 1922 AD 337 347; and 
Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 552). 
13
 See Azanian Peoples’ Organization v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 4 
SA 671 (CC), 1996 8 BCLR 1015 (CC). 
14
 In South Africa this would mean having to circumvent the decision in S v Petane 1988 3 
SA 51 (C). This could be achieved by developing the common law - a duty that the 
courts are charged with under s 39 (1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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  Although the answer to the third question is in no way simple, there is a 
very strong argument to be made that the prescriptive time limitations 
(within which victims must bring their claims) are invalid under 
international law.15 For instance, from 1991 to 1993 Hungary’s parliament 
drafted a number of laws that allowed for the prosecution of crimes 
committed by the previous regime in putting down the uprising of 1956 even 
though they clearly violated the Statute of Limitations set by the previous 
regime.16 Although in a series of cases most of this successive legislation 
was struck down by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, parts of the 1993 
law “Concerning the Procedures in the Matter of Certain Offenses During 
the 1956 October Revolution and Freedom Struggle” were eventually upheld 
with regard to international crimes.17 
 
  Admittedly this bar on time limitations for international crimes does not 
automatically apply to time limitations on private law claims. Nonetheless, it 
would be anomalous to have a bar on time limitations for international 
crimes, thus allowing for the prosecution of international criminals no matter 
when they committed their crime, while at the same time allowing for a time 
limitation on private remedies for the private wrongs that followed from 
those same international crimes. It is not clear that the state’s interest in 
settling its liability and closing the book on the past is sufficient to outweigh 
the rights of victims to appropriate relief. It is harsh enough that the state is 
granting amnesties for those crimes and the resulting delicts and thus 
denying victims rights to a remedy from the perpetrators of those crimes. At 
the very least there is a powerful constitutional case that can be made on the 
grounds that without a condonation mechanism affording victims an 
                                               
15
 Apartheid is specifically referred to as a crime against humanity in Article I(b) of the 
1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations on War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity 754 UNTS 75. The French Cour de Cassation found the non-
applicability of statutory limitations for crimes against humanity to be a part of 
customary international law in Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants 
et Patriotes v Barbie 78 ILR 125 135. There is also academic support for this view: 
Bierzanek, “War Crimes; History and Definition” in Bassiouni (ed) International 
Criminal Law (1986) 47-48; but for the contrary view see Van den Wijngaert, “War 
Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Statutory Limitations” in Bassiouni (ed) 
International Criminal Law (1986) 94-95. 
16
 See Judgment of March 5, 1992 Magyor Kozlony No 23/1992 (Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, 1992) translated in Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe 1 
1994 136 cited in Teitel Transitional Justice (2000) at fn 21 16 discussed 41; see also 
the discussion of this case and the series of cases on legislation leading up to it in 
Halmai and Scheppele “Living Well is the Best Revenge: The Hungarian Approach to 
the Past” in McAdams (ed) Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New 
Democracies (1997) 160-171. 
17
 In the Hungarian Constitutional Court decision 53/1993(X.13)ABh which resulted in 
Act CX of 1993 and investigation into some fifty episodes of mass shooting that took 
place between October 23 and December 28 1956 (cited and discussed in Halmai and 
Scheppele 165-169). 
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opportunity to show good reason why their claims were not brought 
timeously, the prescriptive periods in the Act are unconstitutional because 
they violate section 34 which provides that: 
 
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.” 
 
  It is clear that a number of very difficult legal issues arise with regard to the 
rights of apartheid’s victims. These include, but are not limited to, their right 
of recourse against the state and parastatals, as well as against individual 
perpetrators. Such perpetrators are also not necessarily limited to South 
Africans and South African corporations but may also include claims against 
other states, transnational corporations, and overseas money-lending 
institutions. 
 
  Two further issues that arise include the legal obligations of the post-
apartheid state for debts incurred by the apartheid regime; and the possible 
obligation of those institutions that benefited from apartheid wrongs to make 
reparations to the people of South Africa who suffered from those wrongs. 
 
  In the pages that follow we will briefly address (a) violations of rights not 
specifically covered by the TRC; (b) debt owed to international legal 
entities; (c) debt owed to private money-lending institutions; (d) the 
violation of international labour standards in the apartheid state; and (e) the 
unjust enrichment of foreign corporations at the expense of black South 
Africans.18 
 
3 THE  VIOLATION  OF  RIGHTS  NOT 
SPECIFICALLY  COVERED  BY  THE  ACT 
 
The right to self-determination and the right to be free from systematic racial 
discrimination are not specifically covered in the Act although both of these 
rights form part of the basis for the crime of apartheid. The right to self-
determination is defined in a 1970 General Assembly declaration as 
including the right of people within sovereign states to be governed by a 
“government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour”.19 This unanimously-adopted 
declaration may be seen as the crown on a series of resolutions and treaties 
starting with the UN Charter itself (Article I and Chapters XI and XII). The 
                                               
18
 This is in no way intended to be an exhaustive list of potential liability. 
19
 Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA 
Resolution 2625 (XXV). 
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right can be also found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Article 1); the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (Article 1); and in the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.20 This has led Dugard to 
the conclusion that the right to self-determination is a peremptory norm of 
international law jus cogens - from which no derogation by the state is 
permitted.21 
 
  Similarly the prohibition on systematic racial discrimination (which also 
has its source in the UN Charter and a number of conventions)22 was 
considered to be an obligation erga omnes - one owed by every state to the 
entire international community - by the International Court of Justice in the 
Barcelona Traction case.23 The prohibition on systematic racial dis-
crimination is also considered to be jus cogens.24 
 
  Although South Africa may claim to be a persistent objector (persistent 
objectors are generally exempt from being bound by the relevant customary 
rule of international law)25 such exemption is not permissible when the norm 
in question is peremptory, that is, jus cogens.26 Thus, from at least 1970 
onwards South Africa was in violation of international law in spite of its 
failure to ratify the above treaties or take part in the above General Assembly 
resolutions. 
 
  Article III of the Apartheid Convention provides for individual criminal 
responsibility - not only for those who commit, participate, incite and 
conspire to commit the crime of apartheid as provided for in Article III(a), 
but also for those who directly abet, encourage or co-operate in the crime of 
apartheid as provided for in Article III(b). Article IV(a) places a duty on 
state parties “to adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to 
suppress as well as prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and 
any segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons 
                                               
20
 Resolution 1514 (XV). 
21
 Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 2ed (2000) 460. 
22
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1966); the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966); and the 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973) which 
came into force in 1976. 
23
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd 1970 ICJ Reports 3. 
24
 Brownlie Principles of International Law 4ed (1990) 513; and Dugard (2000) 90-92. 
25
 S v Petane supra 64A-B; the Nicaragua Case 1986 ICJ Reports 107; also Brownlie 
Principles of International Law 5ed (1998) 10; and Shaw International Law 4ed (1997) 
70-72. 
26
 Wallace International Law 3ed (1997) 12; Dugard (2000) 31; and also Akehurst A 
Modern Introduction to International Law 6ed (1987) 32 and 33. 
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guilty of that crime”. There is also a duty, in Article IV(b) “to adopt 
legislative, judicial and administrative measures to prosecute or bring to trial 
those accused of such acts wherever the acts occur and regardless of the 
nationality of the perpetrator”. 
 
4 APARTHEID  DEBT 
 
The general rule in international law is that a change in government within a 
state does not affect its treaty obligations and, according to Dugard, this even 
applies to the legal revolution that took place within South Africa in 1994.27 
This legal fact is confirmed in both the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions.28 The 
1993 Constitution allowed for Parliament to pass legislation specifically 
repudiating pre-1994 treaties. Thus, there was a window of opportunity for 
the new regime to back out of its treaty obligations between the 1993 
Constitution and the 1996 Constitution. But the window was closed in 
section 231(5) of the 1996 Constitution which states that: 
 
“The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on 
the Republic when this Constitution took effect.” 
 
  While there are perhaps good moral reasons for arguing that South Africa 
should not be bound to pre-1994 treaties, there is little legal room for the 
argument given that South Africa has committed herself in her own 
Constitution. Thus, in general, it seems safe to accept that South Africa is 
bound. Nonetheless, it does not follow that every pre-1994 treaty is binding 
on the South African state. There may be cases in which pre-1994 treaties 
(although signed and ratified) were not previously legally binding on the 
apartheid state. If it can be argued that those treaties were not legally binding 
on the apartheid state, then it follows that they are also not legally binding 
under the 1996 Constitution - because the Republic is only bound after 1996 
by treaties that were binding prior to 1996. 
 
  There may, on this thinking, be room to argue that some of the debts 
incurred by the apartheid regime through international agreements with 
states, international organizations and other subjects of international law are 
unenforceable due to the fact that such treaties were always invalid. The 
validity of treaties is governed by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (which is considered as a codification of the customary inter-
national law of treaties). Article 53 of the Vienna Convention provides that: 
 
                                               
27
 Dugard (2000) 341. 
28
 Ss 231(1) of Act 200 of 1993 and 231(5) of Act 108 of 1996. For an interesting 
challenge on this position, see Motala, “Under International Law, Does the New Order 
in South Africa Assume the Obligations and Responsibilities of the Apartheid Order? 
An Argument for Realism over Formalism” (1997) 30 CILSA 287. 
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“A treaty is void, if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law.” 
 
  It is our submission that any treaty which effectively provided financial, 
military or other assistance to the apartheid state in furtherance of its 
criminal regime would conflict with the peremptory norms against 
systematic racial discrimination and the denial of the right to self-
determination. An argument to this effect would require a showing that the 
contents of the international agreement aided or abetted the regime in its 
policies and or practices.29  
 
  There are also arguments based on the doctrine of odious debt.30 The 
underlying principles of the doctrine are very similar to those underlying the 
notion that treaties contrary to a jus cogens are invalid. The principle is that 
debts incurred for illegitimate purposes by illegitimate parties are 
unenforceable. Debts incurred in the furtherance of apartheid would fall 
squarely within this exclusionary principle. The fact that the General 
Assembly did not recognize the apartheid government’s delegation as 
legitimate representatives of the South African state lends even more 
credibility to the argument.31 
 
                                               
29
 As stated earlier in this paper, it is, under the Apartheid Convention, a crime to directly 
abet, encourage or co-operate in the crime of apartheid and all state parties to the 
Convention in fact have a duty not only to refrain from such activity but also to suppress 
and prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid or its segregationist policies. 
30
 This doctrine is relatively unknown in international law. Adams, the director of Probe 
International, has published a book on the subject through her organization, Odious 
Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption, And the Third World's Environmental Legacy 
(1991). The precedent for the doctrine provided by Adams 162-170 is not strong as it is 
limited to a 1923 arbitration case between the Costa Rican Government and the Royal 
Bank of Canada largely on the basis of loans that were for the private benefit of the 
previous Chief of State and his family (ie they were not used for any state purpose); 
Williams and Lauterpacht (eds) Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 
(October 18/1923 Great Britain v Costa Rica); a case wherein the US repudiated the 
debt incurred by Cuba owed to Spain in its peace treaty after the US had taken sovereign 
control of Cuba at the end of the Spanish-American war (in a victor state’s treaty); and 
the Soviet government’s repudiating the debts incurred by the Tsar in the previous 
Russian regime and the scholarly treatment of the situation by Sack, a minister from the 
previous Tsarist regime. Adams also refers to an article in a professional journal written 
by lawyers at the First National Bank of Chicago in 1982 warning lenders of the 
potential risks of making loans that infringed the upon doctrine (ibid 169). 
31
 According to Dugard, the credentials of the delegation from South Africa were not given 
approval by the General Assembly in 1965 and were completely rejected from 1973 
onwards. In 1974 the president of the GA ruled that South Africa could no longer 
participate in the General Assembly as a result of the rejection of her credentials - 
Dugard, “Sanctions Against South Africa: An International Law Perspective” in Orkin 
(ed) Sanctions Against Apartheid (1989) 119-120. It is important to observe that it was 
not the state which was not recognized, but merely the apartheid government. 
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5 FOREIGN  LOANS  MADE  TO  THE  APART-
HEID  STATE  BY  PRIVATE  LENDERS 
 
Private law rules governing the enforcement of contracts are heavily 
influenced by public policy considerations. The common thread that runs 
through private law systems is that contracts concluded contrary to public 
policy are unenforceable.32 Public policy is a resourceful body of doctrine. In 
law it refers to the legal convictions of a particular community. The 
substantive question that arises in public policy issues - what constitutes 
good or else bad public policy - has been dealt with in a markedly similar 
fashion throughout the different jurisdictions. In the Roman-Dutch tradition, 
public policy demands the non-enforceability of any agreement that is “base 
or shameful, such as those that clash with good morals”33 or one that tends to 
“do anything which is held dishonourable by law and morality”.34 In South 
African contract law it refers to agreements that may fall into one of two 
possible categories - those that are “tainted with criminality or those that are 
per se immoral”.35 In English contract law it means that the courts will not 
enforce agreements which “offend one’s sense of morality or justice”.36 As 
stated by Zweigert and Kotz in their An Introduction to Comparative Law 
(2ed): 
 
“Despite the prevalence in the Western world of the freedom of contract, 
every legal system must reserve the right to declare a contract void if it is 
legally or morally offensive, ‘contraire aux bonnes moeurs ou a’ l’ordre 
public’ or ‘contrary to public policy …’ In all legal systems the principal task 
falls to the judge, who has to test the circumstances of the individual case in 
order to discover whether the contracting parties have gone beyond the 
bounds of the permissible.”37 
 
  In most cases the courts are guided by codes or legislation. In fact, all the 
great European codes cover this issue with general clauses referring either to 
prohibitory rules or to the concept of good morals.38 Many countries have 
more particular provisions in their codes and statutes dealing with particular 
types of contracts and the unfairness that may arise within them. 
 
                                               
32
 For the position in South African law, see Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A); 
Unibank Savings and Loans Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 4 SA 191 (W); and also Christie 
The Law of Contract in South Africa 3ed (1996) 377ff. 
33
 Voet 2.14.16.  
34
 Grotius 3.1.42. 
35
 Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 4ed (1989) 152. 
36
 Lloyd The Idea of Law (1964) 272. 
37
 (1992) T Weir Tran. 407-408. 
38
 Eg, Articles 1131 and 1146 of the French Civil Code; ss 134 and 138 of the German 
Civil Code; Article 7 of the Swiss Civil Code; and also Article 1324 of the Italian 
Codice Civile. 
 OBITER 2002 
 
 
 
38 
 
  It is safe to conclude that there is a rule of law, common to most states in 
the civilized world, that a contract contrary to the community’s sense of 
justice is legally unenforceable.39 Bank loans are contracts in the true sense 
of the word. As such, any claim to enforce the repayment of a loan falls 
under the ambit of the rules embraced by the general principles of contract 
law. It is arguable that the successful enforcement of any loan made by a 
private organization to the “old” apartheid state would depend on whether or 
not that loan was made contrary to public policy.40 If the loan was made 
contrary to the legal convictions of the community then repayment of that 
loan will not be enforceable. 
 
  It may be argued that at the time the debt was incurred the contract was not 
contrary to the legal convictions of the South African community. There is 
little question that such contracts were in line with the prevalent convictions 
of the reigning legal community. However, the reigning legal community in 
no way represented the legal convictions of the majority of South Africans 
who were forced to stand by while “their” government borrowed more and 
more money in order to bolster its security forces for the prime purpose of 
keeping black people in a position of subjugation. There can be little 
question that the “true” legal convictions of the (entire) community were 
overwhelmingly against any such aid, loans or support for the apartheid 
regime. 
 
  This argument in no way relies on equating the legal convictions of the 
community with what majority opinion is. The legal convictions of the 
community are based not on what the majority wants. It is not based on their 
volitions, but on their considered judgement about those acts or omission 
that we consider to be not only morally obligatory but also legally binding. 
Erasmus AJ in Reis v Boland Bank Pks Ltd restated the rule as follows:  
 
“conduct is unlawful ‘when the circumstances of the case are of such a nature 
that not only excites moral indignation but also that the legal convictions of 
                                               
39
 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice includes “the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of international law. 
40
 According to a report released by Jubilee 2000 South Africa, Apartheid-Caused Debt 
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the community demand that it ought to be regarded as unlawful and that the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff ought to be made good by the defendant’”41 
 
  This legal conviction within the South African community is further 
bolstered by the legal convictions of the international community. It is clear 
from the literature and indeed the world’s response to apartheid, as detailed 
in earlier parts of this paper, that the legal convictions of the international 
community viewed apartheid as a serious breach of international law. The 
world’s response to apartheid (and the subsequent development of 
international law as a direct result) provides us with a reliable statement of 
what international public policy is. Even the (then) Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Botha, confessed in 1977 “there is no state, no government in the 
world which is our friend. They are all our enemies”.42 
 
  To the extent that apartheid statutory law, case law, and the convictions of 
the reigning legal community supported the view that such loans that were 
used for the primary purpose of propping up the apartheid regime were in 
conformity with the boni mores of the community, they were plainly wrong. 
Apartheid was a crime against humanity and anyone who gave financial or 
other support to the regime aided and abetted that crime. Thus, any contract 
that might have been concluded in furtherance of apartheid’s immoral and 
illegal purposes ought to be unenforceable. This is, we submit, a difficult 
argument to dispute. 
 
  The more complicated aspect of the enquiry involves determining exactly 
when it is that public policy evolved to the point that such loans became not 
only morally but also legally offensive. We have argued that it is probably 
sometime in the early 1970’s, but, without a doubt, the legal convictions of 
the international community solidified by 18 July 1976, the date on which 
the Apartheid Convention came into effect.43 Article 1 of the Convention 
reads: 
 
“The States Parties to the present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime 
against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and 
practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of race segregation 
and discrimination, as defined in Article II of the Convention, are crimes 
violating the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting 
a serious threat to international peace and security. The States Parties to the 
present Convention declare criminal those organisations, institutions and 
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individuals committing the crime of apartheid.” 
 
  While there may be very strong arguments that the legal convictions of the 
South African community solidified much earlier, the date at which the legal 
convictions of the international community solidified provides a good 
marker for putting states, international organizations, institutions as well as 
international corporations on notice that the aid that they were giving to the 
apartheid regime was contrary to public policy. 
 
  According to this, any credit institution or private money-lending 
corporation which may have financed the apartheid state ought to be targeted 
as a profiteer of an immoral and illegal system. It is also possible to argue 
that banks which gave financial support to the apartheid state were in fact 
accomplices to a criminal government that consistently violated international 
law. If the money was lent to the apartheid state and the financier 
subsequently wished to enforce repayment of the loan in terms of the 
contract, then such claim should fail in a court of law for the reasons that we 
have already given - such contracts of loan are contrary to public policy. If 
this were not so then the law would be self-contradictory. No law can treat a 
contract to commit (or assist in the commission of a crime) as enforceable 
because to do this it would be approbating and reprobating the same act - 
this is, of course, inconsistent with the rule of law. 
 
  A financier may foreseeably wish to respond to this argument in the 
following way: if the contract is illegal then surely we are entitled to 
restitution. This is so, the financier might say, because if the transaction is 
truly illegal then surely the South African state would have no right to retain 
the money already paid to it - lest it be unjustly enriched at the expense of 
the financier. This argument cannot be sustained. Most modern jurisdictions 
recognize the general rule that a party who has rendered performance in 
terms of a contract which is void for being contrary to public policy may not 
recover any performance already made. In South Africa, and indeed other 
states that have a Roman law foundation, this rule is given expression in the 
maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis (in equal guilt the 
position of the possessor is the stronger).44 It is, however, commonly 
accepted that the maxim can be overcome in the interests of justice - usually 
where one party would, if the rule were not relaxed, suffer undue hardship. 
This exception would not apply here because any hardship suffered as a 
result of the “illegal” loans would surely be greater for the victims of 
apartheid than it would be for the perpetrators thereof. 
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6 UNFAIR  LABOUR  PRACTICES  UNDER  THE 
APARTHEID  STATE 
 
“Under apartheid black people were things; not human individuals but a 
collective tool for various jobs. This attitude to black workers - that they 
constitute a natural resource - is still with us” (Asmal, Asmal and Roberts).45 
 
  Some of the violations of rights that we have already discussed are 
connected with unfair labour practices in South Africa under Apartheid. 
South Africa was a founding member of the International Labour 
Organization and had in fact ratified 11 international conventions before 
withdrawing in 1964.46 
 
  The racially discriminatory labour policies of the late 1950’s and early 
1960’s caused considerable tension between the ILO and South Africa. 
South Africa’s withdrawal in 1964 did little to ease the tension. Between 
1964 and 1979 the ILO compiled 22 reports and made a number of 
resolutions regarding the unfair labour practices under apartheid.47 
 
  During this period a number of internationally accepted norms were 
violated. They included the fact that black workers were excluded from the 
collective bargaining machinery of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, and 
were instead subjected to a committee system under the Bantu Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act 48 of 1953. Further, although black workers 
were not legally prohibited from forming unions, the unions were not legally 
recognized, and thus were not afforded the same legal protection and 
benefits that white unions were given. Employers were not required to 
recognize the black unions and as a result they were able to harass and 
victimize those who attempted to exercise their rights to association (such 
harassment often being assisted by the police). Strikes were not legally 
permitted under the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act.48 Many 
jobs, especially skilled and semi-skilled jobs, were reserved for whites - for 
example those under the Mines and Works Act 12 of 1911 and also the 
Conciliation Act 28 of 1956.49 The systematic racial discrimination in the 
workplace was further entrenched by the absence of legislation providing for 
fair discipline and dismissal of workers. The plight of black employees was 
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worsened since no reason whatsoever was required for the dismissal of an 
employee under the common law. Finally, the influx control and residential 
segregation laws placed black workers at an even further disadvantage in the 
labour market. 
 
  The consequences of a system like this are predictable. The denial of access 
to legally recognized trade unions and their bargaining power mixed with an 
extremely liberal regime for discipline and dismissal resulted in a labour 
regime that systematically discriminated against black workers, leading to 
the possibility and often actualization of an exploitative work environment 
falling outside the bounds of internationally accepted labour standards. It 
should be noted that the exploitation of the labour of a member of a specific 
racial group is listed as a crime in Article II(e) of the Apartheid Convention 
as: 
 
“legislative and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or groups 
from participating in the political, social, economic and cultural life of a 
country and the deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full 
development of such a group or groups, in particular by denying … basic 
human rights and freedoms, including the right to work,  the right to form 
recognized trade unions …” (our emphasis). 
 
  Dissatisfied workers had to either live with their dissatisfaction or else 
participate in illegal strikes which often resulted in arrest and detention 
coupled with mass dismissals.50 The damages suffered by apartheid’s victims 
as a result of the system includes not only those resultant from an injury to 
dignity but also quantifiable economic loss. Economic loss can range from 
the cost of travel (since segregationist apartheid laws often made it 
impossible for black people to live and work in the same area) to the actual 
loss in earnings or earning capacity. For the purposes of compensatory 
justice, one easy (although undervalued) method of establishing the loss for 
a black worker would be to measure the difference in pay between the 
average salary of a white and black worker performing exactly the same job 
function.51 
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 After 1979 the situation began to change. In 1977 South Africa appointed a Commission 
of Inquiry into Labour Legislation which in its 1979 report recommended that labour 
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  The above discussion establishes the wrongfulness of the practice and also 
the harm suffered by black South Africans as a result of the failure of the 
apartheid government to meet the minimum labour standards required under 
its international law obligations.52 Other foreign governments, their 
parastatals, and private alien companies that invested in apartheid South 
Africa (and in so doing exploited the unjust racist laws) may also have been 
in violation of their international law obligations. The same could be said of 
local employers, local parastatals and local corporations. Thus, we turn to 
examine the unjust enrichment by these profiteers at the expense of black 
South Africans.53 
 
7 UNJUST  ENRICHMENT:  PRIVATE COMPA-
NIES  THAT  INVESTED  IN  THE APARTHEID 
STATE 
 
“Reconciliation requires a readiness to accept responsibility for past human 
rights violations and a commitment, especially by those who have benefited 
and continue to benefit from past discrimination, to the transformation of 
unjust inequalities and de-humanising poverty” - (TRC Report).54 
 
  We have argued that apartheid was immoral, unjust, and illegal. It follows 
logically from this argument that any private company (local or foreign) that 
benefited financially by exploiting these injustices has been unfairly or 
unjustly enriched at the expense of the victims who were exploited. 
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  Private companies investing in South Africa during the apartheid years 
were able to enrich themselves primarily because the conditions detailed in 
earlier parts of this paper made it easy for them to amass wealth by 
exploiting the black people that provided them with cheap and disposable 
labour. South Africa’s (then) constitutional system of parliamentary 
sovereignty effectively enabled the state legislature to enact a plethora of 
statutory provisions, which, when read as a whole, created a repressive 
regime that systematically deprived black people of their basic civil liberties. 
This legislation was aimed at consolidating social, cultural, residential, 
economic and political apartheid. The result of these laws was the creation of 
an unequal society marked by a massive disparity of wealth and access to 
basic resources. Conditions under apartheid did not allow them to achieve 
any meaningful economic potential. At their expense ruthless opportunist 
local and foreign investors continued to grow richer.55 
 
  There can be little scope to dispute that under apartheid private companies 
(both local and foreign) profited by investing in South Africa - because of 
the country’s grossly unjust racist laws. The difficult part of the argument is 
to convert the obvious moral obligation (to give back) that rests on these 
exploitative profiteers into a legally binding duty to do so. 
 
  Unjustified enrichment is a source of legal obligation. It has its origins in 
the Roman law maxim iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius 
detriment fieri locupletiorem (it is fair according to natural law that nobody 
be enriched at the expense of another). Actions based on unjustified 
enrichment are common to most modern legal systems.56 These kinds of 
claims give rise to an obligation in terms of which the enriched party incurs 
a duty to restore the extent of his/her enrichment to the impoverished party. 
Put differently, the impoverished party acquires a legal right to claim that the 
extent of the other’s enrichment be restored to him/her if it was acquired at 
his/her expense. Unjust enrichment is a useful remedy where the claimant 
has not directly suffered a loss (as would need to be the case in a delictual 
claim), but where somebody else has nonetheless benefited at the claimant’s 
expense. 
 
  The problem, from a legal perspective, is that unjustified enrichment is not 
a general source of obligations in South African law. In other words, an 
obligation to compensate an impoverished party will not always arise simply 
because the general features of enrichment are present. This is because South 
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African law does not presently recognize a general enrichment action. A 
claim for unjustified enrichment arises only in certain and very specific 
circumstances. South African law recognizes only three enrichment actions: 
one for the return of something delivered in terms of a contract where the 
other party does not counter-perform; a second where something is delivered 
under a contract that is void; and a third where a bona fide possessor of 
something does improvements to it and in so doing increases its value to the 
benefit of the owner.57 It is apparent that the current body of South African 
common law governing unjustified enrichment makes no specific provision 
for a claim against apartheid-profiteers enriched at the expense of 
apartheid’s victims. The existing body of common law principles do not in 
fact seem to make provision for any type of unjustified enrichment that falls 
outside of the three specified actions identified above. 
 
  There is thus no judicial precedent to support our proposed “extended” 
action. Judicial precedent is always a useful guide in the legal process. In 
law, as in all human affairs, there is a natural tendency to regard the 
decisions of the past as a useful guide to the future. But with law there are 
other considerations too, the most obvious of which is the maintenance of 
certainty in the law. This certainty creates a legitimate expectation amongst 
the subjects of a legal system that judges will follow previous rulings - that 
they will stand by precedents and not disturb settled points. Nonetheless, the 
common law is a living creature whose growth and development is 
incremental. It occurs on a case-by-case basis. As noted by Burchell in his 
preface to Principles of Delict “the law of delict is dynamic - it can, and 
does, develop to meet the needs of a changing society”.58 The question is 
whether the common law should evolve so as to accommodate a new action 
of this kind.59 
 
  We are of the view that the common law is capable of developing in this 
way and that a new type of unjustified enrichment action can be competently 
argued for under the 1996 Constitution. This is because the Constitution 
specifically charges our courts with the task of achieving constitutional 
compliance. This means two things: first, they must interpret the common 
law in such a way as to ensure that the decisions which they hand down are 
not in conflict with the values provided for in the Bill of Rights; and 
secondly, if the common law does not give effect to the values that underlie 
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the Bill of Rights then it must be developed so that it does.60 This raises two 
very important questions. The first question is whether the common law 
governing unjustified enrichment is actually deficient and in need of 
development. The second question is whether there are any values in the Bill 
of Rights that support our argument that unjustified enrichment should be 
developed so as to include an action for apartheid’s profiteers enriched at the 
expense of apartheid’s victims. 
 
  In reply to the first question: The law of unjust enrichment is substantially 
as it was in Holland and Rome. It has not changed much over the past 500 
years. The reality seems to be that the South African common law does not 
recognize a general enrichment action only because Roman law did not. But 
law is an institution and institutions are designed to serve both people and 
society. The needs of people and of society change over time and in this way 
the institutions that serve them must also change to accommodate these 
changing needs. For this reason, there have been numerous academics (and 
judges) who have argued persuasively for the need to develop our common 
law of enrichment: some argue for a general enrichment action whilst others 
argue for one that is more specific to particular needs not catered for under 
the current common law. It is, however, clear that there is considerable 
support for the notion that there is a need to develop the action on account of 
the fact that our modern South African society has needs which are 
substantially different to those of the olden societies in Rome and Holland 
around which the current action was formulated. 61 
 
  In reply to the second question: The values that animate the Bill of Rights, 
namely those that “underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom” should, in our opinion, facilitate developing 
the common law of unjust enrichment so that it can include the kind of claim 
that we have written about in this paper. This is largely, as De Waal, Currie 
and Erasmus put it, because: 
 
“The Bill of Rights can only be properly understood as a part of the 
Constitution as a whole and as a significant element of the Constitution’s 
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project of transforming South African society and its political and legal 
systems.”62 
 
  The legislation that has given birth to the TRC stands as a massive 
testimony to this constitutional commitment and we do not believe that the 
common law of unjustified enrichment can stand aloof of these 
developments. Development of the common law is necessary to achieve 
constitutional compliance - this is the constitutional imperative given to the 
judiciary. The unjust enrichment that occurred also constituted a perpetual 
assault on the core values underlying the Constitution. It was the enrichment 
of some at the expense of others’ freedom, dignity, and equality. This is 
what makes the extension of the action into this area so compelling under the 
final Constitution.63 
 
8 THE  QUESTION  OF  REPARATIONS:  
COMPENSATORY  VERSUS  DISTRIBUTIVE  
JUSTICE 
 
“I have no doubt that you can not separate the amnesty process from the 
reparation process, because people make those connections, and I think that if 
reparation was dealt with better, there would have been a greater acceptance, 
not in total, but a greater acceptance” (Kollapen, Lawyers for Human 
Rights).64 
 
  Kollapen suggests that the amnesty process failed to make a positive impact 
on reconciliation in South Africa partly because of a perception that all sides 
have not benefited equally from it. Jenkins quotes Kollapen to the effect that 
“if anything, there is more of a sense that perpetrators who worked in the 
apartheid regime benefited (more than victims)”.65 
 
  We have spoken in this paper about the need to consider holding 
accountable those profiteers of apartheid who do not fall within the scope of 
the TRC’s mandate. But we have not attempted the massive task of trying to 
decide what form the compensation or reparations ought to take, and how 
they ought to be made to the victims. We are nevertheless of the view that 
whatever form these reparations may take, they should definitely not take the 
same form as those adopted by the TRC for cases that do fall within its 
mandate. We do not believe that an amount of R4 000,00 or R5 000,00 can 
make a significant impact on the lives of apartheid’s victims. Any redress 
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should try to at least make a meaningful difference to the lives of those 
people adversely effected. It should go some way to putting them where they 
would have been had their rights not been violated. 
 
  The issue of reparations is a fairly open one in international law. What is 
clear, however, is that international law does not necessarily consider the 
payment of a sum of money as the best form of reparation. In the Chorzow 
Factory case the Permanent Court of International Justice had the following 
to say: 
 
The object of reparations should be to wipe out, as far as is possible, all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would in 
all probability have existed if the act had not been committed.66 
 
  Wallace is of the view that reparations are designed primarily to restore 
previous conditions and only when this is not possible should they seek to 
compensate.67 But the rules of reparations are seemingly flexible enough to 
allow for virtually any appropriate kind of justice - the appropriateness of the 
remedy would foreseeably differ from case to case. In at least one reported 
case that we are aware of, the tribunal concerned awarded what it called 
“restitution in kind”.68 
 
  It is our view that this line of thinking could be extended so that where 
Wallace speaks of reparations restoring previous conditions, they might, 
where previous conditions were always appalling, rather try to place the 
victims in a position as close as possible to the one that they would have 
been in had their human rights not been violated in the first place. The 
rationale that we offer here is one of distributive justice rather than merely 
compensatory justice. 
 
  Compensatory justice is the claim that victims have to be compensated for 
discreet and ‘finished’ harm done to them. In other words, compensatory 
justice requires an award for harm already suffered. Distributive justice, on 
the other hand, tries to address the general harm suffered by a group of 
people with a view to addressing their current plight by seeking to achieve 
the positions, benefits, and advantages that they might have enjoyed under 
fair conditions - fair conditions in the context of this paper refer to the 
absence of discriminatory laws and practices. 
 
  The two concepts of justice are quite distinct. Distributive justice is a claim 
for justice in the present; compensatory justice is a claim for retroactive 
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justice, for a past wrong committed and for a past harm suffered. The effects 
of the apartheid legacy are by no means a thing of the past. For many black 
South Africans, quality of life now is not much different to what it was under 
apartheid. This is because the injustice of apartheid has continuing effects 
for black people. Similarly, white South Africans continue to enjoy the 
privileges and benefits bestowed upon the white community by apartheid. 
 
  It is our view that there is a very strong objection that can be made to any 
argument seeking to promote the idea of compensatory justice at the expense 
of promoting distributive justice. Compensatory justice is premised on two 
principles: compensation should be paid to the one harmed and it must be 
paid by the one who caused the harm. In cases where this can be established 
then there is little question that victims should be compensated by those who 
violated their rights. However, in cases where the primary victim has passed 
away or even where the primary wrongdoers are either deceased or too 
diffuse to identify by name, it does not follow that the question of justice is 
now moot.  
 
  The unjust benefits and wrongful burdens imposed and facilitated by 
apartheid pass on from generation to generation (through the laws of 
succession and contract). The law itself has facilitated these inequalities. The 
descendants of apartheid’s victims continue to suffer a grave disadvantage. 
Further, it is not only the actual perpetrators of the abuses that have 
benefited from apartheid but also later generations of whites and corporate 
successors who now have unequal advantage to springboard themselves 
ahead of black competitors who are still, for the most part, shackled by the 
disadvantage of apartheid.69 
 
9 CONCLUSION 
 
In some ways we are already witnessing a kind of distributive justice 
unfolding in South Africa today - initiated by the state in the form of 
affirmative action, black economic empowerment, government programmes 
aimed at land reform and wealth redistribution, and policy aimed at 
improving housing, education and social services. But the purpose of our 
paper is to point out that there are other parties - the apartheid profiteers of 
which we have spoken - who should also front up and account for their ill-
                                               
69
 Black South Africans, eg, were deprived of the same educational opportunities that 
whites had and in the process their future career options were limited and with that their 
prospect of economic success. Even after apartheid, whites continued to enjoy a 
privileged education in a superior educational system, while blacks (restricted for the 
most part to townships) continue to suffer an inferior education with inadequate 
infrastructure, overcrowded classrooms, under-qualified teachers, and minimal 
textbooks. 
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gotten gains. This must be done not “as a favour to black people” or because 
of “moral conscience” but rather because there is a legal duty to do so. By 
making it obligatory, one effectively removes the obligation to “give back” 
from the discretion of those that are not bothered by a moral conscience. We 
have tried to demonstrate that there is in fact a legal basis for their 
accountability; the question of how they ought to account nevertheless 
remains open to debate although we suggest that it would work best if done 
in accordance with a distributive justice model, rather than relying solely on 
compensatory justice. 
 
  A distributive justice model could look something like this: Let us suppose 
that under segregationist apartheid laws, spearheaded by the most notorious 
of all, the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, community X are destined to live in 
township Y - an impoverished ghetto in which fresh water and electricity are 
inadequate or non-existent; living conditions poor; roads, sanitary, and 
health-care facilities primitive; and recreational amenities scarce. The 
residents of Y were employed largely by the mining industry. A massive 
gold mine Z made use of this cheap source of labour and exploited every 
possible latitude under the apartheid laws to generate more profit for 
themselves at the expense of their black labour force - and with complete 
disregard to their basic human rights. The black men who worked for Z 
earned precious little. They could not afford to commute regularly and so 
they left their families behind and lived in hostels on the mine. Community 
X suffers tremendously as a result of this migrant labour practice. On our 
argument, Z should be legally accountable since they are unjust profiteers. 
But who should they be accountable to? Our brand of distributive justice 
would require that the profitable gold mine give something back to the 
community that it systematically robbed of so much during the apartheid 
years - not because it is being punished for the evils of the apartheid state 
and legislature, but because it profited from the exploitation of the injustice. 
Company Z could make reparation by contributing to the upliftment of 
community X by, for example, building a school or a library in township Y, 
or improving the roads, and basic services. In this way future generations 
that live in township Y, who would still be adversely effected by the 
continuing impact of apartheid are also addressed in the reckoning. 
 
  This is only one example of how distributive justice may be implemented. 
It may be argued that the community should have a legal claim against such 
companies that profited at the community’s expense. While the exact extent 
of the harm is very difficult to determine, economists could make 
estimations based on levels of prosperity in similar sized communities that 
operated under at least minimal human rights standards, for example, in 
Australia, the UK or the US. In such communities where workers make 
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reasonable wages, one finds decent housing, shops, infrastructure and 
services that are all made possible through those wages, taxes on wages, and 
on property, goods and services purchased through those wages. Thus, it is 
not only the state’s fault that black communities lack the infrastructure and 
services of (previously) white communities but it is also the fault of 
companies and other private actors that exploited the apartheid legal 
framework - the blame can be apportioned. Therein lies the rationale for 
holding them liable, notwithstanding that their liability falls beyond the 
scope of the TRC’s mandate. 
